, where f is a function or a circuit. If the generated homomorphic signature ' δ is valid, then the owner of the dataset (e.g. cloud users) convinces that
Introduction
Compared to some traditional number-theoretic primitives (e.g., factoring problem, discrete logarithm problem), the lattice-based cryptography has the following advantages: i) It is conceptual simple and can be efficient implemented; ii) It can resist so far to quantum cryptanalysis; iii) The lattice-based scheme enjoys the worst case complexity, i.e., any random instance is indeed asymptotically hard [4, 22] . Due to these attractive and distinguishing features, lattice has been widely used to construct a large number of cryptographic schemes. Lattice-based cryptography can be used for constructing versatile theoretical applications ranging from functional encryption [2-3, 6, 9] , to fully homomorphic encryption [11, [17] [18] 25] , and much more [7, 8, 19, 21] .
Cloud computing enables users to store sensitive data in the untrusted sever and sometimes the untrusted cloud requires to perform computations on them. The privacy of data and the authentication of computation are two key secure challenges in this field. Homomorphic encryption schemes [11, [17] [18] 25] can maintain the privacy of user's data by encrypting them and the server can also homomorphic perform computations over the ciphertexts. In this paper, we only focus on the authenticity of homomorphic computation through the notion of homomorphic signatures. In a homomorphic signature scheme, given a signed dataset vector δ and its corresponding message vector μ, anyone can homomorphically compute and produce a new signature δ´ for a message μ´and a circuit C. Given the public parameters and the tuple (C, μ´, δ´), anyone can verify that δ´ is indeed the signature of the message μ´. Note that the verification procedure can be performed without knowing the original dataset μ. In recent years, some homomorphic signature schemes have been proposed [7, 8, 10, 16, 26] . However, many prior works have many drawbacks. In particular, some of them are only homomorphic for linear functions [7, 16, 26] and the security proofs of several schemes are in the random oracle model [7, 16] . In 2011, Boneh and Freeman [7] introduced a linearly homomorphic signature scheme that authenticates vector subspaces of a given ambient space. In the same year, they presented a general definition of homomorphic signatures, and constructed the first homomorphic signature scheme which can compute arbitrary polynomial functions over signed data [8] .
In fact, if we translate these functions to the circuits, then the size of evaluated signatures can grow exponentially in the depth of the circuits. Furthermore, the construction is based on the SIS problem in ideal lattice. Recently, Boyen et al. presented the first adaptively secure fully homomorphic signature scheme that can evaluate any circuit over signed data [10] .
Chameleon hash function, related to the notion of non-interactive chameleon commitment schemes, was originally introduced by Brassard et al. [12] . Roughly speaking, a chameleon trapdoor hash function is a collision-resistance function with chameleon property, i.e., the holder of the trapdoor can easily find collisions for every input. In addition, anyone can compute the hash function using public parameters and the resulting probability distribution is statistically close to uniform over the range. Chameleon hash functions have been proven to be an extremely useful tool in many scenarios, especially in signature schemes. Mohassel showed a general construction for transforming any chameleon hash function to a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme [23] . Recently, Micciancio and Peikert [21] proposed a signature scheme with short parameters and proved its security with strong unforgeability under static chosen-message attack (su-scma). Krawczyk and Rabin [20] showed that there is a generic transformation from su-scma to su-acma (strong unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attack) security using a family of chameleon hash functions.
The main contribution of this work is to build a bridge between FHSS and Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Function (HCHF). In [13] , Cash et al. straightforwardly presented a simple chameleon hash function using the preimage sampleable function under standard lattice assumption. Along this line of work, we give the definition of HCHF and present a family of HCHFs, which is based on the SIS problem in hard random lattices. After that, we construct a leveled fully homomorphic signature scheme using the HCHF tool. Similar to [1] , we use the SampleLeft algorithm to extract signatures in real scheme and use the SampleRight algorithm to response the adversary's signature queries in the simulation game. The construction is straightforward and the security of our scheme is based on the property of collision resistance of HCHF. In fact, our scheme is homomorphic for any function, and not like those ones in [7, 16, 26] just for linear function. Unlike several recent homomorphic signature schemes [7] [8] 16 ], our scheme is secure in the standard model. These results show that our homomorphic scheme is attractive.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. We mainly introduce some basic knowledge about lattice and homomorphic signature scheme in section 2. In section 3 we focus on the definition of HCHF and the specific construction from the standard SIS problem. We describe our homomorphic signature scheme, and provide the parameters setting and security analysis in section 4. Section 5 presents the comparison between our scheme and some classical homomorphic signature schemes. Finally, we draw our conclusions in section 6. . Vectors are assumed to be in column form and are written using bold lower-case letters (e.g. x ). Similarly, we use bold capital-case letters (e.g. A ) to represent matrices.
Preliminaries

Notation
Given two matrices A 1 ∈Z q n×m 1 (2) Lemma 1 [14] Given two random variables X and Y , let chosen-message attack (su-scma). Krawczyk and Rabin [20] showed that there is a generic transformation from su-scma to su-acma (strong unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attack) security using a family of chameleon hash functions. The main contribution of this work is to build a bridge between FHSS and Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Function (HCHF). In [21] , Cash et al. straightforwardly presented a simple chameleon hash function using the preimage sampleable function under standard lattice assumption. Along this line of work, we give the definition of HCHF and present a family of HCHFs, which is based on the SIS problem in hard random lattices. After that, we construct a leveled fully homomorphic signature scheme using the HCHF tool. Similar to [23] , we use the SampleLeft algorithm to extract signatures in real scheme and use the SampleRight algorithm to response the adversary's signature queries in the simulation game. The construction is straightforward and the security of our scheme is based on the property of collision resistance of HCHF. In fact, our scheme is homomorphic for any function, and not like those ones in [13, [15] [16] just for linear function. Unlike several recent homomorphic signature schemes [13] [14] [15] , our scheme is secure in the standard model. These results show that our homomorphic scheme is attractive.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. We mainly introduce some basic knowledge about lattice and homomorphic signature A = max i∈ [m] { a i }, where a i is the column vector of A.
We denote a negligible function f (n) by negl(n) if it is o(n −c ) for any fixed constant c. We say f (n) is polynomial if it is O(n c ) for any fixed constant c, and we use poly(n) to denote it. Given two distributions X and Y over a countable domain Z, the statistical distance between them is defined as ∆ = 
Lemma 1 ([25]). Given two random variables X and Y , let Y be the support of Y . Then H ∞ (X|Y )
H ∞ (X) − log(|Y|).
Lattices and SIS problem
Generally speaking, a lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of R n . A (full rank) lattice Λ can be viewed as the set of all integer linear combinations of n linearly independent basis vectors B = {b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b n }. Using the matrix notation,
be the support of Y . Then
Generally speaking, a lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of 
Definition 2 (Gaussian function). For any real s > 0 and any c ∈ R n , the n-dimensional Gaussian function ρ s,c (x) is defined as
where x is a n-dimensional vector in R n .
Definition 3 (Discrete Gaussian distribution). For any real s > 0, any c ∈ R n , and an n-dimensional lattice Λ, the discrete Gaussian distribution D Λ,s,c over Λ is defined as
where x is a vector in Λ. We omit s and c when they are taken to be 1 and 0, respectively.
Definition 4 (Small integer solution (SIS)
). Given positive integers n, m, q, a real constant β and a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q (m n), find a nonzero vector u ∈ Z m so that Au = 0 mod q and u β.
In fact, the SIS(n, m, q, β) problem is equivalent to find a short nonzero vector u β in the lattice Λ ⊥ (A). Micciancio and Regev [2] showed that the worst case of various promise problems (e.g. GapSV P, GapCV P ) can be reduced to the average case of the SIS problem.
Trapdoors for lattices and Sampling algorithms
Lemma 2 ( [1, 11] ). Given any integers n 1, q 2, and sufficiently large m = O(n log q), there are three efficient algorithms TrapGen, SampleDom and SamplePre having the following description. We also nee [21, 23] (see Algo ly, the algorithm nature system, a be used to exac messages in the s 
A family of lattices, called as q -ary lattices, is of particular interest to many cryptographic applications. 
Definition 1 ( q -ary lattices). For any positive integers
, ), / exp( ) ( 
For any v ∈ Z n q admitting an integral solution x ∈ Z m to Ax = v mod q, define the shifted lattice as
We also need t [21, 23] (see Algorith ly, the algorithm Sam nature system, and be used to exact si messages in the sim
Algorithm 1 Sampl
Require:
where x is a n -dimensional vector in
Homomorphic Signa
A family of lattices, called as q-ary lattices, particular interest to many cryptographic applica s.
Definition 1 (q-ary lattices). For any positive inte n, m, q(m n), let A ∈ Z n×m q be a matrix. D the following m-dimensional q-ary lattices:
For any v ∈ Z n q admitting an integral solution x ∈ to Ax = v mod q, define the shifted lattice as
Definition 2 (Gaussian function). For any real s and any c ∈ R n , the n-dimensional Gaussian fun ρ s,c (x) is defined as
Definition 3 (Discrete Gaussian distribution).
n .
Recently, Micciancio and Peikert [12] proposed a signature scheme with short parameters and proved its security with strong unforgeability under static chosen-message attack (su-scma). Krawczyk and Rabin [20] showed that there is a generic transformation from su-scma to su-acma (strong unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attack) security using a family of chameleon hash functions. The main contribution of this work is to build a bridge between FHSS and Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Function (HCHF). In [21] , Cash et al. straightforwardly presented a simple chameleon hash function using the preimage sampleable function under standard lattice assumption. Along this line of work, we give the definition of HCHF and present a family of HCHFs, which is based on the SIS problem in hard random lattices. After that, we construct a leveled fully homomorphic signature scheme using the HCHF tool. Similar to [23] , we use the SampleLeft algorithm to extract signatures in real scheme and use the SampleRight algorithm to response the adversary's signature queries in the simulation game. The construction is straightforward and the security of our scheme is based on the property of collision resistance of HCHF. In fact, our scheme is homomorphic for any function, and not like those ones in [13, [15] [16] just for linear function. Unlike several recent homomorphic signature schemes [13] [14] [15] , our scheme is secure in the standard model. These results show that our homomorphic scheme is attractive.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. We mainly introduce some basic knowledge about lattice and homomorphic signature trix A ∈ Z n×m q , let s A denote the maximal singular values of A and use A to denote the maximum norm of column vector of the matrix A, i.e., A = max i∈ [m] { a i }, where a i is the column vector of A.
Lemma 1 ([25]). Given two random variables X and
Y , let Y be the support of Y . Then H ∞ (X|Y ) H ∞ (X) − log(|Y|).
Lattices and SIS problem
Generally speaking, a lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of R n . A (full rank) lattice Λ can be viewed as the set of all integer linear combinations of n linearly independent basis vectors B = {b 1 
Definition 4 (Small integer solution (SIS)
Trapdoors for lattices and Sampling algorithms
Lemma 2 ( [1, 11] ). Given any integers n 1, q 2, and sufficiently large m = O(n log q), there are three efficient algorithms TrapGen, SampleDom and SamplePre having the following description.
Given a matrix
We also need two classic sampling algorithms [21, 23] (see Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2). Essentially, the algorithm SampleLeft will be used in real signature system, and the algorithm SampleRight will be used to exact signatures for adversary's queried messages in the simulation game. Micciancio and Regev showed that the worst case of various promise problems (e.g. GapSVP, GapCVP) can be reduced to the average case of the SIS problem [22] . the algorithm SampleLeft will be used in real signature system, and the algorithm SampleRight will be used to exact signatures for adversary's queried messages in the simulation game. 
Trapdoors for lattices and sampling algorithms
Homomorphic signature scheme: definition and security
Throughout this paper, let  be the security parameter.
We denote the message space by  and let  be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in  . Boneh and Freeman [8] first introduced the formal definition of a homomorphic signature scheme for a type of circuit .
 A  -homomorphic signature scheme is a . 
, and an n -dimensional lattice  , the discrete Gaussian distribution Micciancio and Regev showed that the worst case of various promise problems (e.g. GapSVP, GapCVP) can be reduced to the average case of the SIS problem [22] . 
Trapdoors for lattices and sampling algorithms
Homomorphic signature scheme: definition and security
 A  -homomorphic signature scheme is a .
Throughout this paper, let λ be the security parameter. We denote the message space by case of the SIS problem.
Trapdoors for lattices and Sampling algorithms
rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] first introduced the formal definition of a homomorphic signature scheme for a type of circuit C. A C-homomorphic signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms and let case of the SIS problem. rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] first introduced the formal definition of a homomorphic signature scheme for a type of circuit C. A C-homomorphic signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms . Boneh and Freeman [8] first introduced the formal definition of a homomorphic signature scheme for a type of circuit case of the SIS problem. rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] first introduced the formal definition of a homomorphic signature scheme for a type of circuit C. A C-homomorphic signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms . A case of the SIS problem. rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] first introduced the formal definition of a homomorphic signature scheme for a type of circuit C. A C-homomorphic signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms -homomorphic signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms = Π (KeyGen, Sign, Eval, Verify) with the following syntax.
KeyGen
.The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and the maximum size of the dataset k . It outputs a signing secret key sk and a public verification key pk.
_
.The signing algorithm takes as input the secret key sk, a tag
oors for lattices and Sampling algos ( [1, 11] ). Given any integers n 1, q ciently large m = O(n log q), there are ent algorithms TrapGen, SampleDom and having the following description.
rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] first introduced the formal definition of a homomorphic signature scheme for a type of circuit C. A C-homomorphic signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms
. It outputs a signature δ .
.The evaluation algorithm takes as input the public key pk, a tag τ , a collection of message-signature pairs , and a circuit . C ∈ C case of the SIS problem. rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] . It outputs either 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
For correctness, we require that both the original signatures (generated by Sign) and the evaluated signatures (generated by Eval) are accepted. Specifically, we require that the following conditions hold. 1 
For all tags
rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] . In order to maintain the consistency of the verification algorithm, we use the circuit i I to denote the identity mapping, namely,
 .
2 For all tags A signature scheme is fully homomorphic if it is homomorphic for all polynomial-size circuits. In this work, we construct leveled fully homomorphic signature schemes, i.e., they are homomorphic for all polynomial-depth circuits. Next, we define the selectively unforgeable security for homomorphic signature schemes via the following game between a probabilistic polynomial time adversary
The evaluation algorithm takes as input the public key pk, a tag τ , a collection of message-signature pairs {(µ i , δ i )} i∈ [k] , and a circuit C ∈ C. It outputs a signature δ for a message µ .
• Verify(pk, τ, µ, δ, C) The verification algorithm takes as input the public pk, a tag τ , a message-signature pair (µ, δ), and a circuit C ∈ C. It outputs either 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
For correctness, we require that both the original signatures (generated by Sign) and the evaluated signatures (generated by Eval) are accepted. Specifically, we require that the following conditions hold.
1. For all tags τ ∈ {0, 1} λ , all µ ∈ M, and all i ∈ [k], if δ ← Sign(sk, τ, i, µ) then we get Verify(pk, τ, µ, δ, I i ) = 1. In order to maintain the consistency of the verification algorithm, we use the circuit I i to denote the identity mapping, namely,
A signature scheme is fully homomorphic if it is homomorphic for all polynomial-size circuits. In this work, we construct leveled fully homomorphic signature schemes, i.e., they are homomorphic for all polynomial-depth circuits. Next, we define the selectively unforgeable security for homomorphic signature schemes via the following game between a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A and a challenger S.
• The adversary chooses (τ * , µ * , C * ) as the challenged information and gives all information to the challenger.
• The challenger generates (pk, sk) and gives pk to the adversary.
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, tive unforgeability, the adversary can query the signatures of the challenged message vector µ * . In order to make the challenger response for the challenger message vector, we set the adversary's challenged plaintext as a set of messages, rather than a single message. In fact, there are two types of forgers: one is τ * = τ i for all queried i, and the other is τ * = τ i for some index i but µ * = C * (µ * ).
Definition 5 (Selective Unforgeability). A leveled homomorphic signature scheme = (KeyGen, Sign, Eval, Verify) is selectively unforgeable if for any probability polynomial time adversary, the probability of wining the above game is negligible.
Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Functions: Definition and Construction
In [24] , Freeman embed a homomorphic chameleon hash function to show the unforgeability of his homomorphic signature scheme. Based on this and the definition of chameleon hash function [18] , a generic definition of HCHF are given in this section. Note that compared to chameleon hash function, HCHF has an additional property, i.e., homomorphism. Then we construct a class of HCHFs using the distinguished trapdoor function with preimage sampling technique [11] [12] .
Definition 6 (Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Function). For a message space M and a randomness space U , a family of homomorphic chameleon hash functions is a collection H = {h i : M × U → V}, where i is the index and V is the range. There is an algorithm which can generate a public index i and the corresponding trapdoor secret key T i . Homomorphic chameleon hash functions consist of the following four properties:
• Uniformity property For a randomized index i, µ ∈ M, and u ∈ U, the statistical distance and a challenger evaluation algorithm takes as input the public key pk, a tag τ , a collection of message-signature pairs {(µ i , δ i )} i∈ [k] , and a circuit C ∈ C. It outputs a signature δ for a message µ .
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, tures of the challenged messa make the challenger respons sage vector, we set the adve text as a set of messages, rath In fact, there are two types o for all queried i, and the oth index i but µ
Definition 5 (Selective Un homomorphic signature sche Eval, Verify) is selectively probability polynomial time ty of wining the above game
Homomorphic Chamele inition and Construction
In [24] , Freeman embed hash function to show the u momorphic signature schem definition of chameleon hash definition of HCHF are given compared to chameleon ha an additional property, i.e., h construct a class of HCHFs trapdoor function with preim [11] [12] .
Definition 6 (Homomorphic tion). For a message space pace U , a family of homom functions is a collection H = where i is the index and V algorithm which can genera the corresponding trapdoor s phic chameleon hash functio ing four properties:
as the challenged information and gives all information to the challenger.
_ The challenger generates (pk, sk) and gives pk to the adversary.
_ The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i -th query, the adversary chooses a fresh tag
. The challenger generates the collection of signatures ) , , , (
for the i -th query and sends it to the adversary. = (KeyGen, Sign, Eval, Verify) with the following syntax.
• KeyGen(1 λ , 1 k ) The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and the maximum size of the dataset k. It outputs a signing secret key sk and a public verification key pk.
• Sign(sk, τ, i, µ) The signing algorithm takes as input the secret key sk, a tag τ ∈ {0, 1} λ , an index i ∈ [k] and a message µ ∈ M. It outputs a signature δ.
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, the adversary chooses a fresh tag τ i ∈ {0, 1} λ and a k-length message set
The challenger generates the collection of signatures (δ i1 , δ i2 , · · · , δ ik ) for the i-th query and sends it to the adversary.
• The adversary outputs a signature δ * for the chosen tag τ * , a message µ * and the circuit C * .
If Verify(pk, τ * , µ * , δ * , C * ) = 1, then the adversary A wins the game. Due to the definition of selective unforgeability, the adversary can query the signatures of the challenged message vector µ * . In order to make the challenger response for the challenger message vector, we set the adversary's challenged plaintext as a set of messages, rather than a single message. In fact, there are two types of forgers: one is τ * = τ i for all queried i, and the other is τ
Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Functions: Definition and Construction
• Uniformity property For a randomized index i, µ ∈ M, and u ∈ U, the statistical distance
where U H and U V denote the uniform distributions on H and V.
wins the game. Due to the definition of selective unforgeability, the adversary can query the signatures of the challenged message vector μ * . In order to make the challenger response for the challenger message vector, we set the adversary's challenged plaintext as a set of messages, rather than a single message. In 
Definition 5 (Selective Unforgeability
is selectively unforgeable if for any probability polynomial time adversary, the probability of wining the above game is negligible.
Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Functions: Definition and Construction
In [15] , Freeman embed a homomorphic chameleon hash function to show the unforgeability of his homomorphic signature scheme. Based on this and the definition of chameleon hash function [12] , a generic definition of HCHF are given in this section. Note that compared to chameleon hash function, HCHF has an additional property, i.e., homomorphism. Then we construct a class of HCHFs using the distinguished trapdoor function with preimage sampling technique [19, 21] .
Definition 6 (Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Function). For a message space
case of the SIS problem.
Trapdoors for lattices and Sampling algorithms
rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] first introduced the formal definition of a homomorphic signature scheme for a type of circuit C. A C-homomorphic signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms and a randomness space dataset k. It outputs a signing secret key sk and a public verification key pk.
• Sign(sk, τ, i, µ) The signing algorithm takes as input the secret key sk, a tag τ ∈ {0,
1. For all tags τ ∈ {0, 1} λ , all µ ∈ M, and
In order to maintain the consistency of the verification algorithm, we use the circuit I i to denote the identity mapping, namely,
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query,
Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Functions: Definition and Construction
, a family of homomorphic chameleon hash functions is a collection
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, definition of chameleon hash function [18] , a generic definition of HCHF are given in this section. Note that compared to chameleon hash function, HCHF has an additional property, i.e., homomorphism. Then we construct a class of HCHFs using the distinguished trapdoor function with preimage sampling technique [11] [12] .
• Uniformity property For a randomized index i, µ ∈ M, and u ∈ U, the statistical distance where i is the index and
• Uniformity property For a randomized index i, µ ∈ M, and u ∈ U, the statistical distance rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] first introduced the formal definition of a homomorphic signature scheme for a type of circuit C. A C-homomorphic signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms , and Υ ∈ u = (KeyGen, Sign, Eval, Verify) with the following syntax.
If Verify(pk, τ * , µ * , δ * , C * ) = 1, then the adversary A wins the game. Due to the definition of selective unforgeability, the adversary can query the signatures of the challenged message vector µ * . In order to make the challenger response for the challenger message vector, we set the adversary's challenged plaintext as a set of messages, rather than a single message In fact, there are two types of forgers: one is τ * = τ i for all queried i, and the other is τ
Definition 5 (Selective Unforgeability). A leveled homomorphic signature scheme = (KeyGen, Sign Eval, Verify) is selectively unforgeable if for any probability polynomial time adversary, the probability of wining the above game is negligible.
Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Functions: De inition and Construction
In [24] , Freeman embed a homomorphic chamele hash function to show the unforgeability of his homomorphic signature scheme. Based on this and the definition of chameleon hash function [18] , a generic definition of HCHF are given in this section. Note tha compared to chameleon hash function, HCHF has an additional property, i.e., homomorphism. Then we construct a class of HCHFs using the distinguished trapdoor function with preimage sampling technique [11] [12] .
Definition 6 (Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Function). For a message space M and a randomness space U , a family of homomorphic chameleon hash functions is a collection H = {h i : M × U → V} where i is the index and V is the range. There is an algorithm which can generate a public index i and the corresponding trapdoor secret key T i . Homomorphic chameleon hash functions consist of the following four properties:
, the statistical distance
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, definition of HCHF are given in this section. Note that compared to chameleon hash function, HCHF has an additional property, i.e., homomorphism. Then we construct a class of HCHFs using the distinguished trapdoor function with preimage sampling technique [11] [12] .
• Uniformity property For a randomized index i, µ ∈ M, and u ∈ U, the statistical distance is negligible, where and a public verification key pk. • Sign(sk, τ, i, µ) The signing algorithm takes as input the secret key sk, a tag τ ∈ {0, 1} λ , an index i ∈ [k] and a message µ ∈ M. It outputs a signature δ.
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, chosen tag τ * , a message µ * and the c C * .
If Verify(pk, τ * , µ * , δ * , C * ) = 1, then th sary A wins the game. Due to the definition o tive unforgeability, the adversary can query th tures of the challenged message vector µ * . In make the challenger response for the challeng sage vector, we set the adversary's challenge text as a set of messages, rather than a single m In fact, there are two types of forgers: one is for all queried i, and the other is τ
Definition 5 (Selective Unforgeability). A homomorphic signature scheme = (KeyGe Eval, Verify) is selectively unforgeable if probability polynomial time adversary, the pr ty of wining the above game is negligible.
Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Functio inition and Construction
In [24] , Freeman embed a homomorphic c hash function to show the unforgeability of momorphic signature scheme. Based on this definition of chameleon hash function [18] , a definition of HCHF are given in this section. N compared to chameleon hash function, HC an additional property, i.e., homomorphism. T construct a class of HCHFs using the distin trapdoor function with preimage sampling te [11] [12] .
Definition 6 (Homomorphic Chameleon Has tion). For a message space M and a random pace U, a family of homomorphic chamele functions is a collection H = {h i : M × U where i is the index and V is the range. The algorithm which can generate a public inde the corresponding trapdoor secret key T i . Ho phic chameleon hash functions consist of the ing four properties:
• Uniformity property For a randomiz index i, µ ∈ M, and u ∈ U, the statist distance 
The aluation algorithm takes as input the public y pk, a tag τ , a collection of ssage-signature pairs {(µ i , δ i )} i∈ [k] , and a cuit C ∈ C. It outputs a signature δ for a ssage µ . rify(pk, τ, µ, δ, C) The verification orithm takes as input the public pk, a tag τ , essage-signature pair (µ, δ), and a circuit ∈ C. It outputs either 1 (accept) or 0 ject). orrectness, we require that both the origiures (generated by Sign) and the evaluated s (generated by Eval) are accepted. Specifirequire that the following conditions hold. r all tags τ ∈ {0, 1} λ , all µ ∈ M, and
In order to maintain the cy of the verification algorithm, we use the to denote the identity mapping, namely,
nature scheme is fully homomorphic if it orphic for all polynomial-size circuits. In , we construct leveled fully homomorphic schemes, i.e., they are homomorphic for alial-depth circuits. Next, we define the seunforgeable security for homomorphic sighemes via the following game between a tic polynomial time adversary A and a chale adversary chooses (τ * , µ * , C * ) as the allenged information and gives all ormation to the challenger. e challenger generates (pk, sk) and gives pk the adversary. e adversary can make arbitrary polynomial mber of signing queries. In the i-th query,
unforgeability, the adversary can query the signatures of the challenged message vector µ * . In order to make the challenger response for the challenger message vector, we set the adversary's challenged plaintext as a set of messages, rather than a single message. In fact, there are two types of forgers: one is τ * = τ i for all queried i, and the other is τ * = τ i for some index i but µ * = C * (µ * ).
Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Functions: Definition and Construction
Definition 6 (Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Function). For a message space M and a randomness space U, a family of homomorphic chameleon hash functions is a collection H = {h i : M × U → V}, where i is the index and V is the range. There is an algorithm which can generate a public index i and the corresponding trapdoor secret key T i . Homomorphic chameleon hash functions consist of the following four properties:
• Uniformity property For a randomized index i, µ ∈ M, and u ∈ U, the statistical distance 
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, chosen tag τ * , a message µ * and the circuit C * .
If Verify(pk, τ * , µ * , δ * , C * ) = 1, then the adversary A wins the game. Due to the definition of selective unforgeability, the adversary can query the signatures of the challenged message vector µ * . In order to make the challenger response for the challenger message vector, we set the adversary's challenged plaintext as a set of messages, rather than a single message. In fact, there are two types of forgers: one is τ * = τ i for all queried i, and the other is τ * = τ i for some index i but µ * = C * (µ * ).
where U H and U V denote the uniform distributions on H and V. and
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, definition of chameleon hash function [18] , a definition of HCHF are given in this section. N compared to chameleon hash function, HC an additional property, i.e., homomorphism. T construct a class of HCHFs using the distin trapdoor function with preimage sampling te [11] [12] .
Definition 6 (Homomorphic Chameleon Has tion). For a message space M and a random pace U , a family of homomorphic chamele functions is a collection H = {h i : M × U where i is the index and V is the range. The algorithm which can generate a public inde the corresponding trapdoor secret key T i . Ho phic chameleon hash functions consist of the ing four properties:
• Uniformity property For a randomiz index i, µ ∈ M, and u ∈ U, the statist distance rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] first introduced the formal definition of a homomorphic signature scheme for a type of circuit C. A C-homomorphic signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms and ς ∈ v
• Uniformity property For a randomiz index i, µ ∈ M, and u ∈ U, the statist distance • KeyGen(1 λ , 1 k ) The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and the maximum size of the dataset k. It outputs a signing secret key sk and a public verification key pk.
• Sign (sk, τ, i, µ) The signing algorithm takes as input the secret key sk, a tag τ ∈ {0, 1} λ , an index i ∈ [k] and a message µ ∈ M. It outputs a signature δ.
and a circuit e the message space by M and n of circuits which take k inputspace and generate an output in eman [14] first introduced the forhomomorphic signature scheme uit C. A C-homomorphic signale of polynomial time algorithms mpling algors n 1, q g q), there are mpleDom and iption.
rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] first introduced the formal definition of a homomorphic signature scheme for a type of circuit C. A C-homomorphic signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms 
Next, we construct a class of specific HCHFs using the trapdoor technique from standard lattices [19, 21] and prove that it satisfies the above four properties. Let message space by M and circuits which take k inputce and generate an output in [14] first introduced the foromorphic signature scheme . A C-homomorphic signaf polynomial time algorithms
homomorphic if it ial-size circuits. In fully homomorphic omomorphic for alt, we define the ser homomorphic sigg game between a ersary A and a chal- * , µ * , C * ) as the d gives all ger.
(pk, sk) and gives pk rbitrary polynomial . In the i-th query,
inition and Construction
λ , all messages k and all circuits C ∈ C, if and δ ← Eval(pk, τ,
me is fully homomorphic if it ll polynomial-size circuits. In ct leveled fully homomorphic ., they are homomorphic for alrcuits. Next, we define the sesecurity for homomorphic sighe following game between a ial time adversary A and a chalchooses (τ * , µ * , C * ) as the rmation and gives all the challenger. generates (pk, sk) and gives pk . can make arbitrary polynomial ing queries. In the i-th query, definition of chameleon hash function [18] , a generic definition of HCHF are given in this section. Note that compared to chameleon hash function, HCHF has an additional property, i.e., homomorphism. Then we construct a class of HCHFs using the distinguished trapdoor function with preimage sampling technique [11] [12] .
, where
is a random matrix. Using ExtBasis algorithm in [13] , we can obtain a short basis
. Hence, anyone can efficiently perform SamlePre algorithm using the trapdoor G T . We define the homomorphic chameleon hash function A h with index A as follows:
It is not difficult to verify the uniformity and chameleon properties of A h . Specifically, if µ is randomly sampled from Z g , we naturally get the result that the statistical distance is negligible in n [19] . Given the trapdoor matrix A T , we can use the algorithm SamplePre to compute U which has the same distribution as [19] . Next, we prove that the functions constructed by us satisfy the other two properties, i.e., collision resistance and homomorphism. • KeyGen(1 λ , 1 k ) The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and the maximum size of the dataset k. It outputs a signing secret key sk and a public verification key pk.
Theorem 1. Given an integer
• Eval(pk, τ, {(µ i , δ i )} i∈ [k] , C) The evaluation algorithm takes as input the public key pk, a tag τ , a collection of message-signature pairs {(µ i , δ i )} i∈ [k] , and a circuit C ∈ C. It outputs a signature δ for a message µ .
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That is, q mod ) ( ) ( 
Hence, we get a vector r r U U u ' − − = ) ( 2 1 so that . Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we easily have . Next, we only need to prove that the probability of 0 u = is negligible in n . Although r is randomly chosen from
r is mainly dependent on z . Hence,
The second inequality follows from Lemma 1. Therefore, from the definition of average min-entropy,
In summary, if there is an adversary dataset k. It outputs a signing secret key sk and a public verification key pk. • Sign(sk, τ, i, µ) The signing algorithm takes as input the secret key sk, a tag τ ∈ {0, 1} λ , an index i ∈ [k] and a message µ ∈ M. It outputs a signature δ.
• Eval(pk, τ, {(µ i , δ i )} i∈ [k] , C) The evaluation algorithm takes as input the public key pk, a tag τ , a collection of message-signature pairs {(µ i , δ i )} i∈ [k] , and a circuit C ∈ C. It outputs a signature δ for a message µ . • Verify(pk, τ, µ, δ, C) The verification algorithm takes as input the public pk, a tag τ , a message-signature pair (µ, δ), and a circuit C ∈ C. It outputs either 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
• . This concludes the proof.
For the homomorphic property, we consider general arithmetic circuit C . Specifically, we consider four types of gates: addition, multiplication, addition with constant, and multiplication with constant. These four special gates are completely used to compute an arbitrary arithmetic circuit [24] . 
Theorem 2. Given an integer
. mod (15) , mod
. mod Hen'ce,
. mod (17) 3 For an addition with constant gate, Note that an arbitrary arithmetic circuit C can be expressed as the above four gate operations. For a circuit C, we compute * U and * V recursively gate by gate according to the above rules. Therefore, the function A h constructed by us is homomorphic for any arithmetic circuit.
Our leveled homomorphic signature scheme
In this section, we firstly describe our proposed homomorphic signature scheme and then set related parameters for some types of circuits. After that, we give the correctness analysis and security proof for our scheme.
Our construction
In our construction, we employ the public primitive matrix G introduced by Micciancio and Peikert [21] , which naturally has a short basis G T for ) (G ⊥ Λ . Our homomorphic signature scheme = Π (KeyGen, Sign, Eval, Verify) specifically works as follows.
KeyGen
. The algorithm takes the security parameter λ and the maximum size of the dataset k as input. rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] first introduced the formal definition of a homomorphic signature scheme for a type of circuit C. A C-homomorphic signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms as input. 
_
. The evaluation algorithm takes the public key pk, the tag τ , a collection of message-signature pairs , and a circuit Χ ∈ C case of the SIS problem.
Trapdoors for lattices and Sampling algorithms
rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] first introduced the formal definition of a homomorphic signature scheme for a type of circuit C. A C-homomorphic signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms as input. It recursively computes a homomorphic signature gate by gate. rameter. We denote the message space by M and let C be a collection of circuits which take k inputs over the message space and generate an output in M. Boneh and Freeman [14] 
Parameters
Let λ be the security parameter in our scheme. Suppose that the maximum depth of the circuits in our scheme is
We use B to denote the upper bound of the size of evaluated signatures, and use int B to denote the size of the original signatures generated by Sign algorithm.
We assume that ) (λ poly n = , . Moreover, it is guaranteed that at least one input $\ mu$ about this fan-in-2 multiplication gate is of size polynomial in λ . From Theorem 2,
Correctness and security proof
From the parameters setting defined in section 4.2, it is easy to see that the signatures produced by Sign are correct. The correctness of signatures generated by Eval follows from the homomorphic property of HCHF. In this subsection, we mainly discuss the security of our scheme.
Theorem 3. For any adversary
nature schemes via the following game between a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A and a challenger S.
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, trapdoor function wit [11] [12] .
Definition 6 (Homom tion). For a message pace U, a family of functions is a collecti where i is the index algorithm which can the corresponding tra phic chameleon hash ing four properties:
• Uniformity pr index i, µ ∈ M distance ((h negligible, wh uniform distrib mounting a selective unforgeability attack with at most Q queries on our homomorphic signature scheme Π , there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
A signature scheme is fully homom is homomorphic for all polynomial-size this work, we construct leveled fully ho signature schemes, i.e., they are homomo l polynomial-depth circuits. Next, we de lectively unforgeable security for homom nature schemes via the following game probabilistic polynomial time adversary A lenger S.
• The adversary chooses (τ * , µ * , C * challenged information and gives a information to the challenger.
• The challenger generates (pk, sk) a to the adversary.
• The adversary can make arbitrary p number of signing queries. In the i that can find a collision for the randomized HCHF with the following advantage, 4 
Proof. Let A lective unforgeability security game defined in sec-
We show that the the real scheme and i tatistically indistinguis produced by the TrapG tem and is chosen unif lation game. For the m at random in the real sc the simulation game, w at random. For each i, dom in the real system using uniformly random From Lemma 2, the p and in the simulation g guishable. For the suffic s, the outputs of Samp 
Adv
.
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, (sk, τ, i, µ) then we get Verify(pk, τ, µ, δ, I i ) = 1. In order to maintain the consistency of the verification algorithm, we use the circuit I i to denote the identity mapping, namely,
Ho init
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, probabilit ty of wini
Homo inition
In [24 hash func momorph definition definition compared an additio construct trapdoor [11] [12] . . We distinguish between two types of forgers. One is that the adversary will never query all signatures of messages for the tag
Definition tion). Fo
, where * μ is the adversary's forged message. 1 We first consider the situation, where
. The simulation step is as follows: , {(µ i , δ i )} i∈[k] , C) The evaluation algorithm takes as input the public key pk, a tag τ , a collection of message-signature pairs {(µ i , δ i )} i∈ [k] , and a circuit C ∈ C. It outputs a signature δ for a message µ .
generates a public key for the adversary • Sign(sk, τ, i, µ , {(µ i , δ i )} i∈[k] , C) The evaluation algorithm takes as input the public key pk, a tag τ , a collection of message-signature pairs {(µ i , δ i )} i∈ [k] , and a circuit C ∈ C. It outputs a signature δ for a message µ .
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, chosen tag τ , a message µ and C * .
If Verify(pk, τ * , µ * , δ * , C * ) = 1, th sary A wins the game. Due to the defini tive unforgeability, the adversary can qu tures of the challenged message vector µ make the challenger response for the cha sage vector, we set the adversary's chal text as a set of messages, rather than a sin In fact, there are two types of forgers: o for all queried i, and the other is τ
Definition 5 (Selective Unforgeability homomorphic signature scheme = (K Eval, Verify) is selectively unforgeabl probability polynomial time adversary, t ty of wining the above game is negligibl
Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Fu inition and Construction
In [24] , Freeman embed a homomor hash function to show the unforgeabili momorphic signature scheme. Based on definition of chameleon hash function [1 definition of HCHF are given in this sect compared to chameleon hash function an additional property, i.e., homomorphi construct a class of HCHFs using the trapdoor function with preimage sampli [11] [12] .
Definition 6 (Homomorphic Chameleon tion). For a message space M and a ra pace U, a family of homomorphic cha functions is a collection H = {h i : M where i is the index and V is the range algorithm which can generate a public the corresponding trapdoor secret key T phic chameleon hash functions consist o ing four properties:
• Uniformity property For a rand index i, µ ∈ M, and u ∈ U, the s distance 
at random and compute . Output the public key
_ The challenger = (KeyGen, Sign, Eval, Verify) with the following syntax.
•
It outputs a signing secret key sk and a public verification key pk.
generates signatures for the queried messages and the tag i τ . Since
we can use the trapdoor G T to compute the signature ij U so that . ) , (
= (KeyGen, Sign, Eval, Verify) with the following syntax.
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. • KeyGen(1 λ , 1 k ) The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and the maximum size of the dataset k. It outputs a signing secret key sk and a public verification key pk.
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, the adver and a k-le
If Verify(pk sary A wins the tive unforgeabili tures of the chall make the challen sage vector, we text as a set of m In fact, there are for all queried i index i but µ * = Definition 5 (S homomorphic sig Eval, Verify) is probability polyn ty of wining the
Homomorph inition and C
In [24] , Free hash function to momorphic sign definition of cha definition of HCH compared to ch an additional pro construct a class trapdoor functio [11] [12] .
Definition 6 (Ho tion). For a mes pace U, a famil functions is a co where i is the in algorithm which the correspondin phic chameleon ing four properti
We show that the public keys and signatures in the real scheme and in the simulation game are statistically, we require that the following conditions hold. 1. For all tags τ ∈ {0, 1} λ , all µ ∈ M, and all i ∈ [k], if δ ← Sign(sk, τ, i, µ) then we get Verify(pk, τ, µ, δ, I i ) = 1. In order to maintain the consistency of the verification algorithm, we use the circuit I i to denote the identity mapping, namely,
Homomorphic Chame inition and Construct
In [24] , Freeman embe hash function to show the momorphic signature sche definition of chameleon ha definition of HCHF are giv compared to chameleon an additional property, i.e. construct a class of HCH trapdoor function with pre [11] [12] .
Definition 6 (Homomorph tion). For a message spac pace U, a family of hom functions is a collection H where i is the index and V algorithm which can gene the corresponding trapdoo phic chameleon hash func ing four properties: 
Equivalently,
From Theorem 2, we can see that the challenger outputs a signature δ.
• The adversary can make arbitrary polynomial number of signing queries. In the i-th query, sary A wins the game. Due to the definition of selective unforgeability, the adversary can query the signatures of the challenged message vector µ * . In order to make the challenger response for the challenger message vector, we set the adversary's challenged plaintext as a set of messages, rather than a single message. In fact, there are two types of forgers: one is τ * = τ i for all queried i, and the other is τ * = τ i for some index i but µ * = C * (µ * ).
Homomorphic Chameleon Hash Functions: Definition and Construction
In the simulation game, all queried signatures are produced independently through SampleRight algorithm. The adversary parameter λ and the maximum size of the dataset k. It outputs a signing secret key sk and a public verification key pk.
for the i-th query and sends it to the adversary.
• Uniformity property For a randomized index i, µ ∈ M, and u ∈ U, the statistical distance does not query signatures of all the messages with the tag * τ . Thus, gn(sk, τ, i, µ) The signing algorithm takes input the secret key sk, a tag τ ∈ {0, 1} λ , index i ∈ [k] and a message µ ∈ M. It tputs a signature δ. al(pk, τ, {(µ i , δ i )} i∈ [k] , C) The aluation algorithm takes as input the public y pk, a tag τ , a collection of essage-signature pairs {(µ i , δ i )} i∈ [k] , and a cuit C ∈ C. It outputs a signature δ for a essage µ . rify(pk, τ, µ, δ, C) The verification orithm takes as input the public pk, a tag τ , essage-signature pair (µ, δ), and a circuit ∈ C. It outputs either 1 (accept) or 0 ject). correctness, we require that both the origitures (generated by Sign) and the evaluated s (generated by Eval) are accepted. Specifirequire that the following conditions hold. r all tags τ ∈ {0, 1} λ , all µ ∈ M, and [k], if δ ← Sign(sk, τ, i, µ) then we get , τ, µ, δ, I i ) = 1. In order to maintain the cy of the verification algorithm, we use the to denote the identity mapping, namely,
gnature scheme is fully homomorphic if it orphic for all polynomial-size circuits. In , we construct leveled fully homomorphic schemes, i.e., they are homomorphic for alial-depth circuits. Next, we define the seunforgeable security for homomorphic sighemes via the following game between a stic polynomial time adversary A and a chale adversary chooses (τ * , µ * , C * ) as the allenged information and gives all formation to the challenger. e challenger generates (pk, sk) and gives pk the adversary. e adversary can make arbitrary polynomial mber of signing queries. In the i-th query, , δ i2 , · · · , δ ik ) for the i-th query and sends it to the adversary.
, we can obtain
On the other hand, the adversary has the collection of signatures
for the challenged message vector * µ . Therefore, the challenger outputs a signature δ.
• Eval(pk, τ, {(µ i , δ i )} i∈ [k] , C) T evaluation algorithm takes as inpu key pk, a tag τ , a collection of message-signature pairs {(µ i , δ i ) circuit C ∈ C. It outputs a signatu message µ .
• Verify(pk, τ, µ, δ, C) The verific algorithm takes as input the publi a message-signature pair (µ, δ), a C ∈ C. It outputs either 1 (accept (reject).
For correctness, we require that bo nal signatures (generated by Sign) and t signatures (generated by Eval) are accep cally, we require that the following cond 1. For all tags τ ∈ {0,
In order to consistency of the verification algorithm circuit I i to denote the identity mapp
A signature scheme is fully homo is homomorphic for all polynomial-siz this work, we construct leveled fully h signature schemes, i.e., they are homom l polynomial-depth circuits. Next, we d lectively unforgeable security for homo nature schemes via the following gam probabilistic polynomial time adversary lenger S.
• The adversary chooses (τ * , µ * , C challenged information and gives information to the challenger.
• The challenger generates (pk, sk) to the adversary.
• The adversary can make arbitrary number of signing queries. In the can compute the evaluated signature (26) (26) In table 1, the original and evaluated signatures represent the signatures generated by the Sign and Eval algorithm, respectively. "RO" is an abbreviation for "Random Oracle", and similarly "ST" is an abbrevi-ation for "Standard". The last column "permissible functions" means that the signature scheme can support the corresponding type of functions for homomorphic computation over signed data. Note that if some entries in Table 1 are non-integer, we should transform them into integers using the ceil function.
Efficiency
In this section, we consider the efficiency of our scheme by comparing it with some existing classical homomorphic signature schemes in terms of the bit length of the public/private key size, the bit length of signatures, the security model and permissible functions for homomorphic computation. ST Any Table 1 Comparison between our scheme and some classical homomorphic signature schemes Comparison of the bit lengths of public/private key and original signatures ture scheme that can authenticate vectors defined over binary fields. In order to generate the private key, they adopted the method introduced in [5] , which can generate short bases of hard random lattices. Suppose that the generated trapdoor short basis (private key) is A T . It has been shown that ) log ( q n O ≤ A T [5, 7] . Thus in our table, c is a constant so that q log ≤ A T . According to their construction, the parameter m and the Gaussian parameter 1 σ are set equal to   q n log 6 and ) log ( 2 log n w q n c , respectively. In the same year, they proposed another linearly homomorphic signature scheme in section 4 of [8] , which can authenticate any linear function of signed vectors defined over small fields After that, the challenger S outputs the public key (A, B, G, {V i } i∈ [k] ).
• The challenger S generates signatures for the queried messages and the tag τ i . If τ i = τ * , the challenger aborts the game. Otherwise, S straightforwardly outputs the signatures {U i } i∈ [k] for the challenged tag.
Obviously, the challenger does not abort the game with probability 1/Q. Similarly to the above analysis, we can also find that the public keys and signatures in the real scheme and in the simulation game are statistically indistinguishable.
If 
In this section, we consider the efficiency of o scheme by comparing it with some existing classi homomorphic signature schemes in terms of the length of the public/private key size, the bit length signatures, the security model and permissible fu tions for homomorphic computation. Table 1 sho the specific comparison results. In [13] , Boneh a Freeman presented a linearly homomorphic signat scheme that can authenticate vectors defined over nary fields. In order to generate the private key, th adopted the method introduced in [26] , which c generate short bases of hard random lattices. Suppo that the generated trapdoor short basis (private k is T A . It has been shown that T A O(n log [13, 26] . Thus in our table, c is a constant so t T A cn log q. According to their constructi the parameter m and the Gaussian parameter σ 1 set equal to 6n log q and c √ n log 2qw( √ log n), spectively. In the same year, they proposed ano er linearly homomorphic signature scheme in s tion 4 of [14] , which can authenticate any lin function of signed vectors defined over small fie s F p . In their scheme, p and q are two primes that q (nkp) 2 . For convenience, we denote σ 2 p log m √ m log q in Table 1 . In 2014, Boyen et proposed an adaptively secure homomorphic sig ture scheme that can evaluate any circuit over sign data [17] . In their scheme, the Gaussian parame σ 3 = w(m log q √ log m) and the upper bound of size of evaluated signatures B 1 = w(2 d ), where is the maximum depth of the circuits. According section 4.2, the Gaussian parameter σ 4 in our sche is equal to O( √ n log q)w( √ log m), and the up bound B = 2 dw(log λ) . In order to achieve the sa . In order to achieve the same security level, all the above-mentioned homomorphic signature schemes adopt the same parameters when performing the TrapGen algorithm [5] . That is to say, the comparison is fair. Note that in Table 1 , the first two signature schemes [7] [8] are linearly homomorphic in the random oracle model and the latter two ones ( [10] and ours) are fully homomorphic in the standard model. Nevertheless, the comparison result shows that the bit lengths of the private keys are almost exactly the same. Unfortunately, the bit lengths of evaluated signatures in fully homomorphic schemes are larger than those in linearly homomorphic schemes. However, the bit length of evaluated signatures in [10] is almost the same as that in our scheme. Next, we compare the public key size and the size of the original signatures from an experimental point of view. In [8] , the scheme requires two primes p and q . Thus in our experiments, we choose two specific primes 2 = p and 100000007 = q which can meet their requirements. The dimension of random lattices m and the specific constant c are set equal to   q n log 6 and 30, respectively [7] [8] . We set n q n c log 2 log 1 = σ , m q m log log 3 = σ , and m q n log log 4 = σ . In Fig. 1(a) and 1(b) , we investigate the bit length of the public key in terms of the parameter n and the maximum size of the dataset k, respectively. Note that we set the security parameter λ in [10] to n. In Fig. 1(c) , we investigate the bit length of original signatures in terms of n. Evidently, the experimental results imply that the public key size and the size of original signatures in our scheme are smaller than those in [10] . Simultaneously, the public key size and the size of original signatures in our fully homomorphic signature scheme are larger than those in these two linearly homomorphic signature scheme [7] [8] . It is acceptable because fully homomorphic signatures can support any homomorphic computation over signed data, rather than linear homomorphic computation. This may be a compromise between the functionality and efficiency.
Conclusions
In this paper, we first construct a type of HCHFs based on the SIS problem in hard random lattices. Then we use this type of HCHFs to construct fully homomorphic signature schemes for poly-depth circuits. Our construction has many advantages compared to previous works on this study. It is secure in the standard model and the public parameters grow linearly in the size of input circuit. The public key size and the bit length of original signatures of our scheme are smaller than those of the classical fully homomorphic signature scheme [10] . Our future work mainly focuses on designing fully homomorphic signature schemes with constant-size public keys. From a security perspective, the security parameter of the SIS problem in our scheme is
In fact, the size of the evaluated signatures B affects the security of our scheme. Another open problem is to construct fully homomorphic signature schemes in which the size of evaluated signatures is smaller than that in ours.
